

**RESILIENT, INCLUSIVE
SOCIAL CONTRACTS EMERGING FROM
TRANSITIONS:
DRAWING LESSONS FROM TUNISIA
FOR THE MENA REGION**

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
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OVERVIEW

*Objectives: share RSC project framing and findings;
(humbly) reflect on value for MENA region.*

1. Introduction
2. *Forging Resilient Social Contracts – Framing*
3. Findings: General and Tunisia
4. Other analyses & implications, including other MENA Countries
5. Conclusions



THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ENDURING THEMES & QUESTIONS

- *Purpose?*
- *Who the social contract is between?*
- *What mechanisms enforce/forge/sustain it?*
- *How to handle conflicting interests, i.e. how to address moral obligation to others and self-interest, and the distribution of wealth?*

Ancient Era
~1000 BC - 400 AD

Medieval Era and
Renaissance
~400 AD - Early 17th
century

Modern Era 'Classical'
Political Thought
Mid-17th - Early 19th
century

Current
(Contemporary)
Late 19th century -
Now




RESILIENT SOCIAL CONTRACT

A Resilient National Social Contract is a dynamic national agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together, and notably, around how power is distributed and exercised.

It allows for the peaceful mediation of different demands and conflicting interests, and different expectations and understandings of rights and responsibilities (including with nested or overlapping social contracts), over time, and in response to contextual factors (including shocks and stressors), through varied mechanisms, institutions and processes.



DRIVERS OF RESILIENT SOCIAL CONTRACTS




FINDINGS: POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS & SOCIAL CONTRACT MAKING

- **D1: Early stages of peace negotiations offer possibilities for redefining parameters for inclusion & positioning of different groups and issues, but often fail to sustain advances**

RSCs often don't materialise because:


- **CCIs are not effectively addressed over time, undermining ability of political settlement to deliver inclusive results**
- **D1&2: Social contract making "spheres" and "mechanisms" are not well linked to coherently address CCIs and engage resilience capacities**
- **Institutions (including customary, informal and non-state) are not sufficiently engaged in agreement**

Institutional Spheres of Social Contract Making to support inclusive political settlements



FINDINGS: SOCIAL COHESION

- **Poor progress in achieving inclusive political settlements and providing fair service delivery can weaken vertical and horizontal social cohesion**
- **Horizontal social cohesion tends to be stronger within groups than between them, and weaker when political issues (rather than ethnic or religious issues) come into play**
- **Social cohesion initiatives tend to be more effective when driven by communities rather than the state**



WIDER SOCIAL CONTRACT ANALYSIS: TUNISIA & MENA REGION



	Drivers of social contract	Outcomes / Challenges
Tunisia	<p>Driver 1: Inclusive political settlement. CCIs included, but serious challenges addressing them in follow on mechanisms. New CCIs - security related, present profound problems.</p> <p>Driver 2: Institutions - some progress, but economic and security challenges and corruption undermining. Progress on decentralization slow, and conflicted.</p> <p>Driver 3: Social cohesion mixed. Distrust b/tw regions Youth disaffected with state, majority not voting in elections HC: Tolerance b/tw groups ok, incl. secularists and Muslims Affected by D1&2 poor progress</p>	<p>Democracy</p> <p>Wide ownership of political process & outcomes</p> <p>New constitution adopted; high support</p> <p>Five credible elections</p> <p>Economic challenges</p> <p>Slow progress on CCIs</p>
Egypt	<p>Driver 1: Political settlements were driven by inclusive protests, State capture overtook (Morsi-Islamic), El-Sisi (Securitization).</p> <p>Driver 2: Institutions are corrupt, poor service delivery. Securitization of institutions. Military heavily in economy.</p> <p>Driver 3: Vertical and horizontal cohesion very weak. Horizontal SC challenged by Islamic/secular divide</p>	<p>Military dictatorship</p> <p>Militarization of state</p> <p>‘Arab Winter’</p>

CASE STUDY: PROTESTS, THE EVIDENCE (CHENOWETH & STEPHEN)

- Chances of conflict reemerging within the first 10 years in states where transition:
 - was violent are 43%
 - through nonviolent resistance are 23%
- Key factors of NV civil resistance movements being successful:
 - high levels of participation by citizens (diversity, women and youth)
 - Winning over of security forces
 - Variation of methods
 - Holding stable in periods of repression
- States which transition through nonviolent resistance tend to be democratic, higher levels of social trust, etc.



DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY'S RESPONSE, ARAB SPRING (SHAMA 2019)

	Egypt	Tunisia
Degree of Institutionalisation	High	High
Army's Relationship with Regime	<i>Strong (But waning in pre-2011 Period)</i>	<i>Weak, marginalised</i>
Army's Bond with Society	Strong	Strong
Institutional and Economic Benefits	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Limited</i>
Regime Legitimacy	Low	Low
External Aid to Regime	Moderate	Moderate
Prospects of Foreign Intervention	Small	Small

TAKEAWAYS..

- Importance of winning over military and transforming securitised state
- Forging social contract mechanisms to build a more lasting inclusive political settlement, and to sustain peace:
 - Progress in three drivers:
 - *Ensure coherent, inclusive social contracting mechanisms addressing CCIs, engaging resilience capacities*
 - *Transform institutions*
 - *Societally driven social cohesion*
 - Synergize efforts across drivers for catalytic effects
 - Engage and align parallel and competing actors, legitimacies, contracts
 - *A PROPOSED THEORY OF CHANGE FOR SUSTAINING PEACE*